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Politicians, Policy, and Anxiety 
Charlie Kurth, Ph.D. 
 
Department of Philosophy 
Western Michigan University 
 
 
Do we want our politicians to be anxious? The answer may 
seem obvious: no. Consider, for instance, what it would have been 
like to see John F. Kennedy in the grip of anxiety during the Cuban 
missile crisis. Clearly, that’s not what we want—not only does anxie-
ty signal weakness in a leader, but it also tends to bring vicious cycles 
of worry, disengagement, and motivated reasoning that undermine 
one’s decision making. Instead, what it seems we want in our politi-
cians is strength and resoluteness—the “Iron Lady,” Margaret 
Thatcher, not a Woody Allen-like hapless mess.  
But recent research on the upside of anxiety suggests that this 
condemnation comes too quickly. For instance, experimental work in 
political science indicates that anxiety about public policy matters 
spurs voters to become more informed, open-minded, and engaged 
(MacKuen et al. 2010; Valentino et al. 2008; Brader 2006). Similarly, 
work in philosophy suggests that anxiety has an important role to play 
in promoting virtuous thought and action (Kurth 2018a, 2018b, 2015; 
Nagel 2010; Hookway 1999). So, initial appearances to the contrary, 
anxiety may be a good thing. Perhaps what we want, then, is appro-
priately anxious politicians. 
In what follows, I will use a set of historical case studies as 
well as research in the social and cognitive sciences to explain what 
this appropriate anxiety involves and why it is valuable in political 
leaders. The result will be a richer, more complex portrait of anxiety 
and its value.  
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Background: Politicians and their Anxieties 
 
Before getting into the case studies, it will be helpful to say a 
little more about the focal question of this essay. In particular, I’m not 
interested in the descriptive question: Are politicians anxious? This, 
after all, is an easy question to answer. A quick review of the news 
headlines reveals that—just like the rest of us—politicians get anx-
ious. Witness: “Amid chief of staff search, Trump increasingly anx-
ious over political future” (Collins 2018); “‘I am worried’: Macron’s 
chat with Saudi prince captured at G20” (Borger 2018); “Is Theresa 
May right to worry about a hard border causing a united Ireland?” 
(Maguire 2018).  
Rather, the question I’m interested in is a normative one—
Should politicians be anxious (regardless of whether they actually 
are)? More specifically, I’m interested in anxiety as it pertains to pol-
icy issues (not, say, dinner choices or existential matters). That is, I’m 
interested in things like whether President Trump should have been 
anxious about shutting down the government to get money for a wall 
on the U.S.-Mexico border. And I’m interested in whether Prime 
Minister May should be anxious about pressing for her Brexit plan in 
the face of strong opposition from the Labor Party. With this sharpen-
ing of the question in hand, we can now turn to the first case study to 
start to get some answers.  
 
Case Study 1: The Abolition of Slavery 
 
In this first case study, I want to focus on a couple of exam-
ples of anxiety in politicians as they confronted the institution of slav-
ery. Looking at these individuals will help us draw out some lessons 
about the value and diversity of anxiety. 
The first example concerns the anxiety of the Duke of Wel-
lington when, in 1833, the government of the United Kingdom was 
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considering legislation to abolish slavery. Speaking before Parliament 
on the pending emancipation legislation, Wellington remarked, “Who 
can regard the change from a State of slavery to a state of freedom, of 
a population of no less than 800,000 persons, otherwise than with 
feelings of anxiety?” As Wellington went on to explain, the cause of 
his anxiety was the speed with which the institution of slavery was 
being dismantled: he was worried that slaves would be freed before 
“they had become civilized” (Debates in Parliament 1833: 533-4). 
The second example focuses on an episode in the life of the 
Quaker abolitionist John Woolman as it he explains it in his posthu-
mously published Journal (1952). Early in his life, Woolman worked 
as a clerk and, at one point, his boss asked him to write up a bill of 
sale for a slave that he (the boss) was selling. With regard to that re-
quest, Woolman wrote:  
 
I felt uneasy at the thoughts of writing an instrument of 
slavery for one of my fellow-creatures, yet I remem-
bered that I was hired by the year [and] that it was my 
master who directed me to do it … [So] through weak-
ness I gave way, and wrote it. (1952: 26, emphasis 
added) 
 
However, when it came time to actually execute the bill of 
sale to consummate the transaction, Woolman recounts that “I was so 
afflicted in my mind, that I said before my master and the Friend that I 
believed slave-keeping to be a practice inconsistent with the Christian 
religion” (26-7, emphasis added). Moreover, though Woolman wrote 
the bill of sale in this case, the event had a lasting effect on his beliefs 
and attitudes. For instance, the next time he was asked to write a simi-
lar document, he refused. And the memories of the incident—and the 
anxiety it involved—gave shape to much of his subsequent efforts as 
an abolitionist (1952: 27). 
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With these examples in hand, I now want to extract two les-
sons—lessons that will enrich our understanding of the nature and 
value of anxiety that we see in these political leaders.  
The first lesson is evaluative: in the cases of Wellington and 
Woolman we have two very different responses. In particular, Wel-
lington’s response is problematic. Not only is his anxiety grounded in 
morally dubious claims about slaves as “uncivilized,” but his anxiety 
appears to motivate his opposition to the abolition legislation. That is, 
his anxiety appears to have prompted a self-interested motivation to 
protect the status quo.1  
By contrast, Woolman’s anxious response reflects well on 
him. Being asked to facilitate the sale of another human being, though 
part of his charge as a clerk, leaves him feeling uneasy. Moreover, 
and more importantly, the anxiety that Woolman feels leads him to 
reconsider—and reject—his initial decision to sanction the sale (as 
well as future ones). Thus, in Woolman’s unease, we see an emotion 
that brings a concern to make the right choice—one that then prompts 
him to rethink his decision and protest the sale.  
The second lesson—one that will be important for the discus-
sion that follows—builds from an observation about the nature of the 
anxieties we see in Wellington and Woolman: though both are anx-
ious, they appear to be experiencing different kinds of anxiety. To 
draw this out, we should first be clear about why it makes sense to see 
both Wellington and Woolman as experiencing anxiety (rather than, 
say, fear or shame). At a high level, two features unify the unease of 
Wellington and Woolman as instances of anxiety. In both cases the 
unease is elicited by uncertainty about a potential threat or challenge, 
and it prompts a combination of risk minimization and risk assess-
 
1 The idea that emotions are motivationally-laden, and that particular emotions 
shape our motivations in distinctive ways, is commonplace in both emotion re-
search and common sense (e.g., fear prompts a fight/fight/freeze response; compas-
sion brings efforts to help). For more on the distinctive motivations associated with 
anxiety, see Kurth 2018a, 2016. 
The Center for the Study of Ethics in Society, Vol. XXV No. 1 
5 
ment efforts. But the details of how these two features manifest them-
selves are importantly different. It’s these differences, then, that sug-
gest Wellington and Woolman are experiencing different kinds of 
anxiety. 
For Wellington, we have an instance of what I will call “threat 
anxiety.” The Duke’s unease is provoked by his uncertainty about a 
potential (physical or social) threat—namely, the unknowns and risks 
that he associates with freeing 800,000 slaves. Moreover, uncertainty 
of this particular sort brings a defensively oriented response—one that 
emphasizes risk minimization (e.g., opposing the legislation to fore-
stall the potential threat). In contrast, to the threat anxiety of Welling-
ton, Woolman displays what we can call “practical anxiety.” His wor-
ries are brought about by his uncertainty about the correctness of his 
decision to write the bill of sale. Yet given the distinctiveness of this 
uncertainty, we get a different reaction: a set of epistemic behaviors—
reflection, reassessment, information-gathering—that are geared to-
ward helping Woolman work through the difficult choice that he fac-
es.2  
With these two lessons in hand, we can turn to see what light 
they shed on questions about anxiety’s value for politicians. First, we 
get support for the earlier suggestion that appropriate anxiety in a 
politician can be valuable. Part of what the contrast between Welling-
ton and Woolman draws out is that, while anxiety that can sometimes 
be a liability, it can also be an asset. But given the distinction between 
different kinds of anxiety we just made, we can say more. In particu-
lar, the two examples suggest that what we want in a politician is 
practical anxiety of the sort we see in Woolman, not the threat anxie-
ty of Wellington. Moreover, we also get a sense for why we want ap-
propriately, practically anxious politicians. The Woolman example 
 
2 See Kurth 2018a: Chaps 2-3; 2016, for more on anxiety in general, as well as, how 
we might make principled (and empirically well-supported) distinctions between 
different kinds of anxiety.  
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suggests that practical anxiety is an emotion that undergirds a valua-
ble sensitivity and responsiveness. Woolman’s practical anxiety about 
whether to fulfill his boss’s request functions as an alarm, one that 
helps him recognize that his initial decision to write the bill of sale 
might not be correct. But his anxiety also plays an important motiva-
tional role: it initiates the reflection and reassessment that helps 
Woolman recognize—and correct—his mistake.  
To help drive home the value of this practical anxiety-driven 
sensitivity and responsiveness, we can look to cases of other practi-
cally anxious politicians. For instance, in her autobiography, the suf-
fragist Elizabeth Cady Stanton recounts the (practical) anxiety that 
she felt about getting married. At the heart of her unease were worries 
about how she could get married—in an era when marriage entailed, 
both socially and legally, accepting subordination and inferior sta-
tus—while also maintaining her status as a leading defender of wom-
en’s equality. Not only did her anxiety appear to help her appreciate 
this conflict, but it also spurred reflection that enabled her see how 
she could reconcile the pulls of both love and the cause (1898/1993, 
chaps. 2–5).  
Similarly, Nelson Mandela often remarked on the unease that 
the demands of being both a father and a freedom fighter brought. In 
fact, these anxieties led him to reflect on “whether one was ever justi-
fied in neglecting the welfare of one’s own family in order to fight for 
the welfare of others” (1994: 212). Mandela’s anxiety not only re-
veals his sensitivity to important—though clashing—values, but it 
also underlies our assessment of him. Were he not anxious about how 
to reconcile his competing obligations to his family and the cause, our 
admiration of him as a moral exemplar would diminish. 
However, while these examples help draw out why practical 
anxiety is a valuable and admirable trait for political leaders to pos-
sess, the story is more complicated. After all, as anyone who has ex-
perienced anxiety knows, anxiety can lead us astray in all kinds of 
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unfortunate ways. This is no less true for politicians than it is for the 
rest of us. To see how practical anxiety in a politician can be a liabil-
ity, consider the example of the British Prime Minister Neville 
Chamberlain. In 1938, Chamberlain and the French Premier Édouard 
Daladier met with Hitler to negotiate what would become the Munich 
Agreement, the compact where the Allied powers agreed to hand over 
a significant portion of Czechoslovakia to Germany in the hopes of 
sating Hitler’s expansionist ambitions. When Chamberlain returned to 
Britain after signing that unfortunate agreement, he was called before 
Parliament to defend his actions. In response, he explained that it was 
“anxiety, . . . not threats [that] made possible the concessions” to Hit-
ler (Parliamentary Debates, 1938). In this context, it seems that the 
anxiety that Chamberlain mentions is practical anxiety—anxiety 
about the difficult choice the Allied powers faced in their meeting 
with a war-hungry Hitler—and it seems this anxiety was (in part) the 
driver of the disastrous decision to sacrifice the Czechs.3 
Stepping back then, the claim that politicians should be (prac-
tically) anxious needs further defense if it’s to be plausible. In par-
ticular, we need to know what—if anything—can be done to prevent 
occasions of anxiety-run-amok of the sort that we find in the example 
of Chamberlain at Munich. 
 
Case Study 2:  
Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Vietnam War 
 
As a start on the question of what we might be able to do to 
avoid Chamberlain-like episodes of practical anxiety leading to disas-
trous political decisions, we can take a look at the decision of Martin 
Luther King, Jr., to publicly protest the War in Vietnam.  
 
3 On the problems wrought by Chamberlain’s decision, consider Winston Churchill 
comment: “You were given the choice between war and dishonour. You chose dis-
honour and you will have war.” 
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First, some background. In the early 1960s, King recognized 
that he would need the support of President Lyndon Johnson if civil 
rights legislation was going to be passed. As result, King chose not to 
say anything negative about the United States’ involvement in Vi-
etnam. But as time wore on, not only did the war in Vietnam escalate, 
but people started calling King out for being a hypocrite. In particular, 
they could not understand how King could be so vocal an opponent of 
the use of violence in his fight for civil rights, but be completely si-
lent about the violence—the escalating war!—in Vietnam.  
These criticisms stung, and as a result, King reversed his ear-
lier decision not to confront the Johnson administration on the War. 
The result was King’s famous “A Time to Break Silence” speech in 
1967. In that speech, King explained his decision: 
 
As I have walked among the desperate, rejected, and 
angry young men, I have told them that Molotov cock-
tails and rifles would not solve their problems. I have 
tried to offer them my deepest compassion while main-
taining my conviction that social change comes most 
meaningfully through nonviolent action. But they 
ask—and rightly so—what about Vietnam? They ask if 
our own nation wasn’t using massive doses of violence 
to solve its problems, to bring about the changes it 
wanted. Their questions hit home, and I knew that I 
could never again raise my voice against the violence 
of the oppressed in the ghettos without having first 
spoken clearly to the greatest purveyor of violence in 
the world today—my own government. For the sake of 
those boys, for the sake of this government, for the 
sake of the hundreds of thousands trembling under our 
violence, I cannot be silent. (King 1967)  
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However, King’s decision to start publicly protesting the War 
was immediately and severely criticized (the War, after all, was still 
fairly popular in the U.S. in 1967). The rebuke was a surprise—one 
that left King unsure about whether he had made the right decision. 
Here is how he explains what he was going through at that point: 
 
When I first took my position against the war in Vi-
etnam, almost every newspaper in the country criti-
cized me. It was a low period in my life. … It wasn’t 
only white people either; it was Negroes. But then I 
remember a newsman coming to me one day and say-
ing, “Dr. King, don’t you think you’re going to have to 
change your position now because so many people are 
criticizing you? And people who once had respect for 
you are going to lose respect for you. And you’re go-
ing to hurt the budget, I understand, of the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference; people have cut off 
support. And don’t you think that you have to move 
more in line with the administration’s policy?” That 
was a good question, because he was asking me the 
question of whether I was going to think about what 
happens to me or what happens to truth and justice in 
this situation.  
 
On some positions, Cowardice asks the question, “Is it 
safe?” Expediency asks the question, “Is it politic?” 
And Vanity comes along and asks the question, “Is it 
popular?” But Conscience asks the question, “Is it 
right?” And there comes a time when one must take a 
position that is neither safe, nor politic, nor popular, 
but he must do it because Conscience tells him it is 
right. (King 1998, 342) 
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While King’s reflections and actions are powerful on their 
own, I also think they shed light on what we should say in response to 
Chamberlain-like issues of anxiety run amok in politicians.  
Focusing the second paragraph in the above remarks, the first 
thing to notice is that King seems to be reflecting both on his feelings 
at the time and on the effect those emotions were having on his 
thoughts and actions. So, for instance, in talking about cowardice and 
questions about what’s “safe,” King seems to be reflecting not just on 
his feelings of fear (or threat anxiety), but also on how those fears 
were pushing him to act defensively. Similarly, in talking about vani-
ty and what’s “popular,” King appears to recognize the pull of pride 
and its tendency to get him to act in ways that would help polish his 
public image. But more importantly for our purposes, there’s also 
King’s talk of conscience and the attendant question about what is 
right. Here King seems to not only be acknowledging that he’s feeling 
something like practical anxiety about his decision to protest the War, 
but also that he is aware of how his anxiety is getting him to reflect on 
the question of whether his decision was the correct one.  
Seeing the richness of King’s emotional self-awareness is sig-
nificant. It reveals the complexity and skill that underlies the emo-
tional assessment he’s engaged in. More specifically, we see that 
King is exhibiting a complex skill: what he’s doing requires him to 
have and to engage a range of distinct mental operations. For in-
stance, King needs a capacity for what psychologists call emotion 
recognition, the ability to appreciate that the feeling he is experienc-
ing is an emotion, not a bout of indigestion or fatigue. But King also 
needs to have the capacity for emotion differentiation: the ability to 
identify what specific emotion(s) he is feeling at a given time—fear, 
pride, practical anxiety, etc. Finally, King needs to have emotional 
knowledge: an understanding of the effects that particular emotions 
can have on his subsequent thoughts, feelings, and actions.  
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Now here’s the thing to notice. A (big) part of what lies be-
hind King’s resoluteness in the face of both the public criticisms of 
his decision and his own worries about whether he had made the right 
choice was his capacity to engage in things like emotion recognition, 
differentiation, and understanding. But if—as it seems—these capaci-
ties are skill-like, then they are capacities that politicians can develop 
in order to channel productive emotions and redirect problematic 
ones. Moreover, empirical work in psychology and cognitive science 
suggests that these capacities are skill-like. For instance, Buddhist 
techniques of mindfulness and meditation have been shown to be ef-
fective ways for individuals to enhance their ability to track their ex-
periences and recognize when they’re feeling emotions, and when 
they’re just (say) tired or in a bad mood (Teper et al. 2013; Futsos et 
al. 2013). Similarly, exercises that boost people’s emotional vocabu-
lary can help them better identify the emotions that they’re experienc-
ing—it gives them the conceptual resources they need to move be-
yond just thinking they’re upset; rather, with an enhanced emotion 
vocabulary, they can see that they’re feeling (say) anger but not in-
dignation, contempt, or disgust (Kashdan et al. 2015; Barrett 2017). 
Finally, various forms of guided instruction have been shown to help 
individuals better understand how particular emotions work 
(Hagelskamp et al. 2013; Brackett et al. 2012).  
These empirical findings are noteworthy for two reasons. 
First, they license optimism regarding our ability to shape (practical) 
anxiety for the better. What we see in King—the emotional attune-
ment he displays—is a skill that other politicians can develop. Sec-
ond, recall the earlier observation that threat and practical anxiety are 
distinct forms of anxiety. If that’s right, then the above techniques can 
be fine-tuned: we can use them not just for anxiety in general, but for 
practical anxiety in particular. That is, if practical anxiety is a distinct 
type of anxiety, then there is something specific in our cognitive 
make-up for the cultivation of these techniques to latch onto. 
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Stepping back, then, the King example helps us see that the 
anxiety-run-amok of Chamberlain is not inevitable. Emotions—
including practical anxiety—are things that can be cultivated. But the 
King case also gives us an understanding of what it means to say that 
politicians should cultivate their anxiety. It does not mean they should 
just feel more anxiety or feel their anxiety more intensely. That could 
bring Chamberlain-like disasters. Rather, cultivating (practical) anxie-
ty involves learning to feel it at the right times, in the right way, and 
to the right degree. Here the King example gives us a sense for what 
this amounts to. 
 
Two Worries: Contagion and Manipulation 
 
The discussion so far—in particular the idea that politicians 
should be cultivating their anxiety—is likely to raise worries. I now 
want to consider two concerns that might have been raised. 
The launching-off point for the first worry is the observation 
that emotions are contagious. The basic idea here is familiar. When I 
see that you are afraid, disgusted, or happy, that can lead me to feel 
afraid, disgusted, or happy too. In fact, scholars as far back as Darwin 
(1873), have taken this tendency for emotions to be contagious to be 
central to how they’re able to do the important work that they do. 
Consider an example. If disgust is an emotion that functions to protect 
us from contaminants (poisons, parasites, and the like), then it would 
be good for feelings of disgust to be contagious. If seeing your retch 
at the (rotten) meat on the table makes me feel disgusted, then I won’t 
eat what has just made you sick. Moreover, this tendency for emo-
tions to be contagious is something we see in anxiety—both as a mat-
ter of our own experiences (seeing my wife worry about the mortgage 
gets me worrying too) and through the experimental work of psy-
chologists (e.g., Parkinson & Simons 2012).  
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So here, then, is the issue. If we combine (i) the idea that we 
ought to promote anxiety in politicians with (ii) the observation that 
anxiety is contagious, it seems we’re going to get a more anxious 
general public. And that might seem like a very bad result. After all, 
both mental health professionals and the news media are sounding 
alarms about the growing anxieties of the public. Witness a recent 
headline in Time: “A Lot of Americans Are More Anxious Than They 
Were Last Year” (Ducharme 2018). Similarly, the National Institute 
of Mental Health (NIMH) warns that there are 40 million anxious 
Americans—and there’s concern because this number is growing.  
To assess this worry, some clarifications will be helpful. The 
first thing to notice is that what the NIMH and others tend to be fo-
cused on is the growing prevalence of anxiety disorders, not the prac-
tical anxiety that’s our focus. Second, the reports of anxiety that we 
see in the news are about individuals’ experiences of anxiety in gen-
eral, not anxiety that is appropriate given the situation at hand. 
Bringing these points together, then, suggests that what NIMH and 
the media are worried about—disorders and general anxieties—is not 
what we’ve been focused on: appropriate practical anxiety. Moreover, 
empirical work by political scientists suggests that appropriate practi-
cal anxiety—particularly in the voting public—is beneficial: it tends 
to promote a more informed, more open-minded, and more engaged 
electorate (MacKuen et al. 2010; Valentino et al. 2008; Brader 2006). 
So rather than being a problem, contagious practical anxiety could be 
a good thing! 
To draw out the second worry, a worry about manipulation, 
we can start with an analogy. It doesn’t take much thought to realize 
that a good book for spotting genuine antiques is also—in the wrong 
hands—a good book for making it hard to detect fake antiques. With 
that in mind, one might worry that in helping politicians understand 
how to cultivate their anxiety, we are just providing them with a 
guidebook for how to manipulate public anxieties for their own gain 
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(Albertson & Gadarian 2015, Edelman 1985). The worry is real. An 
often-cited example concerns immigration, where appeals to violence, 
drugs, and disease are used to stoke anxieties with the hope of bolster-
ing opposition to more open borders. Witness Donald Trump in the 
speech where he announced that he would be running for President:  
 
When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending 
their best. They’re not sending you. … They’re send-
ing people that have lots of problems, and they’re 
bringing those problems with us [sic]. They’re bring-
ing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. 
And some, I assume, are good people. 
 
In response to this second concern, I want to again start with a 
couple of clarifications. First, any system can by hijacked by a suita-
bly vicious person, so it’s unclear that this “anxiety can be manipulat-
ed” worry raises issues that are distinct to anxiety. That is, it seems 
the issue is not so much with the idea that we should cultivate anxiety 
in politicians as it is with the lamentable fact that there are crummy 
politicians out there. Second, manipulation efforts work best when the 
targets of the manipulation don’t realize that they are being manipu-
lated. This fact about how manipulation works suggests that we can 
circumvent the manipulation threat by extending our efforts to pro-
mote emotional awareness, emotion differentiation, and emotion 
knowledge in the general public.  
Put another way, recognizing the potential for the public’s 
anxieties to be manipulated points to a general policy prescription: we 
should be doing more to promote emotion education. On this front, 
there is some interesting work being done. Some of it, informed by 
research in psychology, goes under the label of “emotional intelli-
gence” (e.g., Salovey et al. 2008; Goleman 2005), while other tech-
niques build on Aristotelian insights about moral and emotional de-
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velopment being like the development of musical or athletic skills 
(Kristjansson 2018, Snow 2015). While this is not the place to get in-
to the details of these proposals, it’s worth highlighting that there is a 




To bring this discussion to a close, we can return to four ques-
tions that we have been wrestling with. First, in response to the ques-
tion—should politicians be anxious?—the answer is that it depends. If 
we’re talking about appropriate anxiety, then the answer is yes. But if 
we’re thinking about anxiety more generally, then anxiety is not 
something we want to see in our leaders. Second, we’ve learned what 
appropriate anxiety is. It’s the practical anxiety of Woolman, Man-
dela, and Stanton—felt at the right time and in the right way—not the 
anxiety of Wellington or Chamberlain. Third, in response to why ap-
propriate practical anxiety is valuable, we can now see that it’s valua-
ble because it brings an important form of emotional attunement: a 
sensitivity and responsiveness to hard choices. Finally, we can say 
something about what can be done to promote appropriate anxiety in 
politicians. Here the example of Martin Luther King, Jr. (and the em-
pirical work that substantiates it) offers a template for what politicians 








4 A version of this paper was presented as part of the WMU Center for the Study of 
Ethics and Society Lecture Series. I’d like to thank the audience for a fruitful dis-
cussion of the ideas discussed here.  
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